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During the last decade, debit card transactions grew rapidly in most advanced countries. While 
check usage declined and has almost disappeared in some countries, the stock of currency in 
circulation has not declined as fast.  We use panel estimation techniques to analyze the change in 
transactional demand for cash resulting from greater usage of debit cards in 13 countries from 
1988 to 2003.  We are able to disentangle cash’s store of value function from its payment 
function by separating cash into three denomination categories.  We find that the demand for low 
denomination notes and coins decreases as debit card usage increases because merchants need to 
make less change for customer purchases.  On the other hand, the demand for high denomination 
notes is generally less affected suggesting that these denomination notes are also used for non-
transactional purposes.   
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  In this article, we study the factors influencing the adoption of electronic payment 
alternatives such as debit cards and their impact on cash usage.  This area of research is relevant 
for several reasons.  First, greater usage of cash substitutes affects how much cash the central 
bank should supply.  Economists continue to debate the implications of a possible reduction in 
currency demand for monetary policy (Buiter, 2005; Chakravorti, 2006; Freedman, 2000, 
Friedman, 1999; Goodhart, 2000; Kroszner, 2003; Woodford, 2000).  One consequence of lower 
demand for cash is a decrease in seigniorage revenue.  Humphrey, Kaloudis, and Øwre (2004) 
view outstanding currency as interest-free loans and if there is a significant reduction in the 
quantity of cash in circulation resulting from the use of alternative payment instruments, the 
potential loan repayment would be very large.  Second, some economists have suggested social 
welfare would improve if fewer cash transactions occurred (De Grauwe, Buyst, and Rinaldi 
2000; Van Hove, 2004a).  However, whether the number of cash transaction has indeed declined 
in recent years proved to be a tricky empirical question, owing to difficulties in separating cash’s 
payment function from its store of value function.  Third, the relationship between the 
willingness of consumers and merchants to adopt non-cash payment alternatives and the pricing 
of those payment instruments has attracted considerable research attention (Chakravorti and 
McHugh, 2002; Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala, 1996; Markose and Loke, 2002; Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003).  Any debate on the pricing of payment instruments should start with studying the 
factors influencing the migration from cash to other payment media.  Our analysis provides a 
necessary first step to address these issues.      
We discuss payment trends in thirteen countries—Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland,  
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States—from 1988 to 2003.  We find that in most countries, debit card usage has 
increased significantly and check usage continues to decrease or has almost disappeared.       2
However, the aggregate demand for cash has not fallen drastically with widespread adoption of 
non-cash payment instruments.  Unlike other payment instruments, cash serves as a universally 
accessible store of value in addition to being a payment medium.  Thus, any analysis of the 
impact of cash alternatives must first disentangle the two competing functions of cash.  This task 
is complicated further by the unique anonymity feature of cash, which is valued highly by those 
trying to avoid detection by the public authorities.  Cash transactions are more difficult to trace 
to the transactors because it can be used multiple times without third-party intervention unlike 
payment cards where each transaction is converted to good funds.  Consequently, cash has an 
enduring appeal for facilitating illicit transactions, as well as for storing ill-gotten (or, at least, 
untaxed) wealth (Drehmann, Goodhart, and Krueger, 2002). 
  Our analysis differs from the existing literature in the following ways.  First, we 
decompose cash demand by currency denomination type to better identify the transactional 
motive for cash holdings.  Denominations larger than those commonly dispensed by a country’s 
ATMs are posited to be better suited for store of value purposes.  Although ATM-dispensed 
banknotes form the bulk of transactional currency demand by volume, analysis of fluctuations in 
such “medium-value” denominations presents a number of empirical challenges.  In particular, 
the rapid growth of ATM networks over the past two decades had a theoretically ambiguous 
effect on observed quantities of medium-value notes in circulation.  On the one hand, more 
ATMs may have reduced the stock of such notes by lowering transaction costs of obtaining 
them.  On the other hand, the need to stock a larger number of ATMs with currency to be 
dispensed may have generated the opposite effect.  Consequently, medium-value banknotes 
represent a noisy data source for establishing a relationship between the growth of alternative 
payment instruments and cash demand.  In contrast, the demand for smaller denomination notes 
and coins is unaffected by secular changes in ATM networks.  Rather, we argue that these forms      3
of cash capture the demand by merchants and other receivers of cash to make change for 
purchases.  Since change is given only in the case of cash transactions, changes in the stock of 
small notes and coins provide a better gauge of fluctuations in transactional demand for 
currency.  Although other papers employed currency decomposition by denomination (see e.g. 
Drehmann, Goodhart, and Krueger, 2002; Fischer, Köhler, and Seitz, 2004; and Porter and 
Judson, 1996), we believe that ours is the first paper to attempt identification of cash demand 
through its “trickling down” to change-making small denomination notes and coins. 
Second, we employ different econometric techniques than those commonly used in this 
literature to address strong serial correlation that is present when analyzing annual cross-country 
payments data.  We show that results depend importantly on the choice of the econometric 
model.  Finally, our data covers the time period of rapid growth in debit card usage in almost all 
countries in the sample.  That is, unlike many of the previous studies, we are able to analyze the 
effect of accelerating and decelerating changes in debit card usage on cash demand.   
Providers of debit card services must convince both consumers and merchants to use 
them over existing and emerging payment alternatives.  We find that enabling consumers to use 
debit cards is not sufficient to increase their usage.  The recent payments literature using a two-
sided market framework highlights the importance of having both sides—payors and payees—on 
board (Armstrong, 2004; Rochet and Tirole, 2003).  Consumers, for the most part unknowingly, 
added debit cards to their wallets because they were mainly seen as devices to access cash and 
make deposits at automated teller machines (ATMs) that became popular almost a decade before 
widespread debit card usage.  They were unable to use their cards to make purchases until 
merchants adopted POS debit terminals.  While adoption of payments technology by end-users 
does not guarantee widespread usage, in the case of debit cards, we show that adoption of debit      4
card terminals by merchants was the critical step that led to the explosive growth in debit card 
transactions. 
  Finally, we study the impact of debit card usage on the stock of currency and coin 
outstanding.  The impact of debit cards varies by currency denomination category.  We find that 
larger denomination notes are affected by the short-term interest rate but not by the adoption of 
POS debit card terminals.  However, both debit card infrastructure and financial institution 
branch infrastructure significantly affects the demand for small denomination notes and coins 
whereas the short-term interest rate has little effect.  This result supports the hypothesis that 
small denomination notes and coins are required to make change for purchases when cash is 
used.  If cash is not used, the demand for change and consequently the demand for small 
denomination notes and coins both decrease.  Because financial institutions are the main 
distributors of small denomination notes and coins, less debit card usage requires a more 
extensive branch network to distribute and collect small denomination notes and coins.   
  This article is organized as follows.  In section 1, we discuss payment trends across the 
countries in our sample.  In section 2, we review the literature that analyzes the impact of 
electronic payment alternatives on cash.  We discuss the data in section 3 and analyze the key 
factors driving the adoption of debit cards in section 4.  In section 5, we focus on the relationship 
between the adoption of debit cards and changes in the stock of cash, broken by denomination 
categories.  We offer some concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
I.  Cross-Country Payment Trend Comparisons 
While there are major differences in banking and regulatory structures along with 
differences in cultural attitudes toward payments between countries in our sample, certain 
common payment trends exist.  First, debit card usage grew rapidly during the 1990s in most      5
countries in our sample.  In Figure 1, we plot debit card transactions over time by country.  In 
1988, all countries except for Finland had less than 10 debit card transactions per person per 
year.  By 2004, all countries except Japan had more than 10 transactions per person per year and 
several had more than 60.  The increase in debit card transactions suggests that the net benefits of 
using debit cards have increased vis-à-vis other payment instruments for consumers and 
merchants (assuming that the total number of transactions is growing at a slower rate than debit 
card transactions.)   
The second common trend is that check usage continues to decrease in most countries 
and has disappeared in many countries. There are eight countries where on average less than two 
checks per person were written in 2004 (see Table 1).  Even in countries with a relatively high 
number of check transactions such as Canada (43 checks/person), France (66 checks/person), the 
United Kingdom (35 checks/person), and the United States (119 checks/person), check usage 
continues to decline.  Some studies find that debit cards have substituted for check transactions 
(Borzekowski and Kiser, 2006 and Klee, 2006).   
Third, cash has not disappeared from these countries although several cash substitutes 
exist.
1  While general-purpose stored-value cards have not been widely adopted, other general-
purpose payment instruments, e.g. credit and debit cards, can now be used for transactions in 
environments that were until recently “cash only.”
2  Mass transit and fast food restaurants 
represent just two of the more ubiquitous industries where such switch took place.  Some surveys 
of merchants and consumers suggest that cash demand for transactions is decreasing in many 
                                                 
1 Originally, checks were a cash substitute.  Humphrey (2004) reports that in addition to replacing cash transactions 
for consumer payments, employee disbursements, and smaller-value business purchases shortly after the Civil War, 
checks were used until 1915 for large-value business transactions and interbank transfers in the United States.  
2 For more on the lack of widespread acceptance of general-purpose stored value, see Chakravorti (2004) and Van 
Hove (2004b).  More recently, prepaid cards have become popular for certain applications such as gift giving and 
disbursement of payroll and government benefits in the United States.  For more details, see Chakravorti and Lubasi 
(2006).      6
countries (American Bankers Association and Dove Consulting, 2005; Jyrkönen, 2004; Stix, 
2003).   
One metric to compare cash transactions across countries is the total per capita annual 
non-cash transactions.  Generally, greater use of non-cash payment instruments indicates a lesser 
reliance on cash as a payment medium.
3  The number of non-cash transactions per capita in 2004 
(Table 1) ranges from 36 for Japan to 288 for the United States.  Furthermore, non-cash 
transactions have increased between 2001 and 2004 for all countries in our sample, suggesting a 
reduction in cash transactions over time within a country. 
Two measures of overall cash demand are cash holdings per capita and cash outstanding 
to GDP ratio.  However, these two measures are unable to distinguish between cash’s store of 
value and payment functions.  In Table 2, we compare countries by their per capita currency 
holdings (in US dollars) and their ratio of the stock of currency to GDP in 1998.
4  Currency per 
capita ranges from $613 for Finland to $3,620 for Japan.  Similarly, the currency to GDP ratio 
ranges from .024 for Finland to .116 for Japan.  For the most part, the ordering of countries is 
similar for both “stock” measures of currency demand.  The ordering is also consistent with the 
“flow” measure of currency demand summarized in Table 1.
5 
Several researchers have noted that it is unlikely that the average individual in these 
countries hold this much cash.  Rogoff (1998) states that between 70 percent to 80 percent of 
OECD currency stock is either held by the domestic underground economy or in developing 
countries.  In addition to household cash holdings, Rogoff argues that businesses (presumably 
legal ones) are very efficient in cash management and are not likely to hold much cash in OECD 
                                                 
3 Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala (1996) were the first, to our knowledge, to use this metric to compare cash usage 
across countries. 
4 We chose 1998 to stay sufficiently far from the introduction of the euro in 2002 and the increase in Y2K 
precautionary supply in 1999 for some countries. 
5 Germany, Switzerland, and the United States represent important exceptions, since a substantial share of the 
currency stock of these countries is estimated to be held abroad.  We address this issue below.      7
countries.  While it is difficult to measure underground activity, some estimates suggest that it is 
sizable.  Schneider (2006) estimates that the shadow economy in 21 OECD countries averaged 
16.3 percent of GDP during the period 2002-2003.  He states that the primary justification for 
why transactions take place in the shadow economy is tax avoidance. 
For certain countries, these measures overstate domestic cash usage because significant 
holdings of their currencies are held outside their countries’ borders.  U.S. dollars being held 
outside of the United States have been estimated to be around 60 percent of total currency in 
circulation (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2003).
6  Prior to the introduction of the Euro in 2002, 
up to forty percent of deutsche marks circulated outside of Germany (Seitz, 1995).  Large 
portions of Swiss francs are believed to be either held outside of Switzerland or held in safe 
deposit banks inside the country (Boeschoten, 1992; Fischer, Köhler, and Seitz, 2004; and 
Rogoff, 1998).  Rogoff (1998) also suggests that a non-trivial amount of Japanese currency is 
probably held outside of Japan but there is little hard evidence.   
Several economists have attempted to quantify legal currency usage by studying 
consumption patterns.
7  For instance, Humphrey (2004) calculates total cash purchases as the 
residual of personal consumption that is not captured by check, debit card, or credit card 
registered transactions.  Humphrey eliminates $50 and $100 notes from his estimation to better 
gauge legal uses of currency.  Humphrey estimates that cash share of legal consumer payments 
fell from .31 in 1974 to .20 in 2000 in the United States.   
For Sweden, Andersson and Guibourg (2001) estimated that cash payments in registered 
sales (those for which value-added tax are collected) declined by 18 percent between 1991 and 
1999.  They suggest that almost all of the decline has been due to greater usage of payment 
                                                 
6 Lambert and Stanton (2001) and Porter and Judson (1996) discuss foreign demand of U.S. currency. 
7 See Carbo Valverde, Humphrey, and Lopez del Paso (2003), Humphrey, Kaloudis, and Øwre (2004), and 
Snellman, Vesala, and Humprey (2001).      8
cards.  However, they are unable to explain 45 percent to 65 percent of cash holdings.  They 
suggest that anonymity may be a critical factor in continued cash usage especially for 
transactions that use the 1,000 Swedish krona note.
8 
   
II.  Literature Review 
  The theoretical literature on money demand is quite large.
9  Many models extend the 
Baumol (1952)-Tobin (1956) model where interest rates, income, and the acquisition costs of 
cash including shoe leather costs, determine the supply of money.  Payment practices and 
transactions costs are fundamental features of these models.
10    
  This article best fits in the empirical literature that investigates changes in cash demand 
resulting from the adoption of new payment infrastructure for cash or non-cash payment 
alternatives. The empirical literature on cross-country payment usage continues to grow.  
Extensive research in the area of Dutch currency usage and the adoption of alternative payment 
media was done by Boeschoten (1992).  He noted the difficulty in disentangling the transactional 
use from other uses of currency, most notably hoarding.  He found that adoption of credit cards 
and “point-of-sale transactions” were responsible for 40 percent of the fall in currency ratio 
between 1965 and 1975. However, this trend reversed from 1975 to 1990 indicating an increased 
role for banknotes as a store of value.  He estimates that 50 percent to 60 percent of the Dutch 
currency was hoarded in 1990.   
In addition to his study of Dutch money demand, Boeschoten estimated money demand 
using a 15-country panel.  He found significant hoarding in these countries as well.  He was able 
to predict future currency holdings based on the adoption of payment cards but not for all the 
                                                 
8 As of December 31, 2006, the Swedish krona/U.S. dollar rate was 6.85. 
9 Duca and VanHoose (2004) reviews this literature. 
10 For more recent models using an inventory approach, see Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2003).      9
countries in his sample.  He also analyzed percentage of currency held by financial institutions 
and found that on average 13 percent of currency outstanding is held by financial institutions for 
the countries in his sample.   
Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala (1996) (henceforth HPV) studied the factors influencing 
the migration to less costly payment alternatives such as debit cards and electronic and paper 
giros.  They looked at 14 countries for the time period from 1987 to 1993.  They used five 
regressions where the dependent variable was the annual transactions volume of one of the five 
payment instruments (check, electronic or paper giro, credit card, and debit card).  Their 
independent variables included the prices of each payment instrument (only available for 10 of 
the countries), real GDP, number of POS and ATM terminals, lagged volumes of the other 
payment instruments, cash holdings per person, violent crime, and concentration ratio of the 
largest five banks. 
They found the following.  The influence of prices was modest because often prices for 
payment instruments did not vary much during their sample period and bundled across all 
account services.  POS and ATM terminals are strongly positively related to debit card usage 
suggesting that similar infrastructure is used. They found that all payment instruments except for 
debit cards substitute for cash.  The institutional variables measuring crime and banking 
concentration were not stable across different econometric models. 
  Unlike HPV, Drehmann, Goodhart, and Krueger (2002) (henceforth DGK) regress 
aggregate cash holdings per capita on several macro variables (real GDP per capita, nominal 
interest rates, and tax GDP ratio), two  payment infrastructure variables (ATMs and POS 
terminals), and crime.  They divide currency into large bills (greater than 50 British pounds) and 
small bills (less than 50 British pounds). Their rationale for this division is to separate illegal use 
of cash from transactional use.  While they get significant estimates for the coefficients for the      10
macro variables, they do not get significant results for the payment infrastructure variables or 
crime. 
Another approach to isolate the impact of debit cards on cash usage is to survey 
individuals and their payment habits.  While surveys of relatively small sample of individuals 
over a small period of time has its limitations, these studies may help to explain the demand for 
cash given payment alternatives from a microeconomic aspect that is not present in aggregate 
studies of money demand.  For Austria, Stix (2003) finds that those individuals that make 
purchases frequently with debit cards on average hold 20 percent less cash in their wallets and 
those that frequent ATMs hold 18 percent less cash in their wallets.  For France, Bounie and 
François (2006) find that transaction size, type of good and where the purchase is made are key 
factors for the consumer choice of a payment instrument.
11  They also find that cash and checks, 
not surprisingly, are common when merchants do not accept payment cards.  In addition, they are 
able to confirm well-established demographic factors that determine payment usage such as age, 
education, and gender.   
  
III.   Data 
We employ three different data sources.  For payment data, currency outstanding, 
population, and banking infrastructure, we use the Bank for International  Settlements’ 
Committee of Payment Settlement Systems’ Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in 
Selected Countries (Red Book) and the European Central Bank’s Payment and Securities 
Systems in the European Union (Blue Book).
12  We also contacted several central banks for 
clarification and to fill in some of the missing data.  For short-term interest rates, foreign 
                                                 
11 For theoretical models that address the link between size of transaction and payment instrument, see Shy and 
Tarkka (2002) and Whitesell (1992). 
12 We used the Blue Book for Austrian and Finnish data.      11
exchange rates, gross domestic product, and the ratio of self-employed to total employment, we 
use the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. 
A key dependent variable in our regressions is the ratio of outstanding currency to GDP.  
Cash outstanding includes holdings by businesses, individuals and financial institutions but 
excludes cash held at central banks.  For euro countries, we only consider the period from 1988 
to 1999, which eliminates the last two pre-Euro years in which currency stocks (particularly 
those of large-denomination notes) started to decline in anticipation of the regime switch.  For 
the other countries, the sample period is from 1988 to 2003.  
For certain regressions, we divide cash outstanding/GDP into three categories— large, 
medium, and small denominations.  The Red and Blue books provide currency outstanding for 
each note denominations and coin type.  The medium denomination note category was chosen by 
surveying the central banks of the respective countries to determine which denomination was 
prevalently distributed by ATMs.  Denominations above this threshold were categorized as large 
denominations, while those below this threshold (including coins) were categorized as small 
denominations.   
In some countries, only a single currency note is commonly distributed by ATMs (e.g., 
the $20 note in the United States).  In other countries (e.g. Germany), ATMs routinely provide a 
set of different denominations.  In such cases, we categorize all of the ATM-distributed 
denominations as medium.  Table 3 summarizes the data on currency denominations and ATM 
conventions in each of the countries in our sample.  The large category includes denominations 
above “medium” and small includes denominations below “medium” along with coins.  If the 
highest denomination is also the main denomination for ATM withdrawals (as is the case in 
Japan with the ¥10,000 note), we categorize it as large.  Other currency such as a US $2      12
banknote, commemorative or limited edition coins or banknotes were excluded from the 
denomination data. 
  In several countries higher denomination coins were introduced during our sample 
period, replacing, in some cases, paper notes of similar value.  In these cases, we kept the coin 
and note within the same denomination category.  In addition, certain currency denominations 
were replaced by new denominations.  In these cases, we kept both new note and the old note 
that it was replacing in the same category. 
  As mentioned in the introduction, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States have a 
sizable fraction of their currencies held outside their countries’ borders.  Since foreign holdings 
are much less likely to be influenced by domestic cash and debit card infrastructure, we need to 
adjust our cash measures.  In the case of the United States, we use the Flow of Funds Accounts 
series on currency holdings abroad.  For Germany, we utilize the time series estimates of Fisher, 
Kohler, and Seitz (2004).
13 Data limitations prevent us from making any adjustments for Swiss 
currency stocks. 
  The following variables were taken from the Red and Blue books: number of ATMs, 
number of POS debit card terminals, number of debit cards, number of checks, and number of 
bank branches.  Each of these variables was normalized to per capita terms by dividing each 
variable by the population of each country during that year with the exception of POS debit 
terminals.  POS debit terminals were normalized by 10,000 individuals.  
As in any cross-country study, certain variables may not be defined consistently.  For 
example, definitions of debit cards vary somewhat across countries.  Although “debit” 
transactions are usually associated with nearly immediate withdrawal of funds, in some countries 
(e.g. France) “debit” cards include those in which the funds may be withdrawn up to one month 
                                                 
13 Since holdings of domestic currency abroad are heavily concentrated in large denomination notes (Judson and 
Porter, 1996), we subtract the estimated foreign holdings from large denomination notes series for both Germany 
and the United States.      13
following the transaction.  Because in most countries in our sample, PIN-based debit cards are 
much more widely used than signature-based cards and data for PIN-based transactions are more 
consistent, we focus on the usage of PIN-based debit cards.  In most countries in our sample, all 
debit cards are PIN-based.     
   
IV.   Adoption of Debit Cards  
The ultimate goal of this paper is to understand the relationship between electronic cash 
substitutes like debit cards and demand for currency.  Observed debit card transactions appear to 
be a good gauge of the extent to which such cards represent a viable alternative to cash.  
However, using transactions data directly to explain fluctuations in cash demand presents two 
empirical problems.  The first problem is one of measurement.  In several countries, reported 
debit card transaction data are incomplete, in the sense that they only capture a part of debit card 
payments.  For instance, in the United States, signature debit card payments are executed over 
credit card networks and do not consistently appear as a part of “debit” transactions.  In some 
cases, credit and debit card transactions are not separated, e.g. France.  The second problem is 
econometric.  A flow measure of debit card use is an endogenous variable, in the sense that it is 
influenced by the same factors that affect transactional cash demand.  Some of these factors may 
be unobserved or unavailable, making coefficient estimates on debit card transactions both 
biased and inconsistent.  One example of such an omitted factor is the cost of debit card use, 
which clearly influences both cash and debit use in transacting payments. 
To circumvent these problems to some extent, we rely on measures of debit card 
infrastructure rather than usage, namely, the number of debit cards in circulation and the number 
of debit card terminals.  Both of these variables are measured more precisely, and are less likely 
to be directly affected by omitted factors influencing cash usage.  For example, the consumer      14
cost of a debit card transaction is less likely to be reflected in the number of debit card terminals 
installed by merchants.  Yet, it may offer a reasonable proxy of merchant expectations on debit 
card use at the point of sale.   
Instrumenting debit card usage by these infrastructure variables has an additional benefit 
in that it allows us to study the factors influencing debit card adoption.  In particular, we are 
interested in whether consumer or merchant acceptance contributed to the takeoff of debit cards 
and an alternative payment instrument.  As mentioned before, debit and ATM functionality 
usually reside on the same card.  Therefore, many debit cards were held by consumers before 
they were able to use them to make purchases.  On the other hand, merchant acceptance was 
contingent on the expectation that debit cards would be used if terminals were installed and the 
net benefits of accepting debit cards were greater than accepting alternative payment media.  
Clearly, a key factor in deciding to accept debit cards is the cost of doing so.  Recently, 
economists have applied two-sided market analysis to payment cards to study pricing of payment 
services.
14  The literature on two-sided markets stresses that the proportion of the total price paid 
by each end-user group need not be symmetric to achieve optimal usage levels.  In fact, many 
two-sided markets have asymmetric pricing between end-users such as newspapers (readers and 
advertisers), Adobe Acrobat (creators and readers of PDF files), and dating clubs (women may 
be let in at a reduced price and men pay a higher fee).   
  For the most part, consumers do not pay per-transaction debit card fees.
15  Although there 
may be a bundled fee for a transaction account, once that is paid the marginal cost to use a debit 
card is close to zero.  In most instances, merchants that accept debit cards face fixed and per-
                                                 
14 For more on two-sided markets, see Armstrong (2004) and Rochet and Tirole (2003). 
15 There are some exceptions.  While not common, a few U.S. merchants impose surcharges on PIN-based debit 
transactions (Chakravorti and Shah, 2003).  In addition, some U.S. financial institutions impose per-transaction fees 
for PIN-based debit card transactions.      15
transaction fees.
16  While we do not have pricing data, we can compare adoption of debit cards 
by consumers and merchants by looking at the number of debit cards and debit terminals, 
respectively. 
Table 4 presents data on the number of debit terminals per 10,000 individuals along with 
debit cards/person in 2003.
17  Countries in our sample that have high debit card usage also 
generally have high card adoption by consumers and high adoption of terminals by merchants.  
However, this relationship is far from uniform.  For instance, Italy has relatively few debit cards 
per capita despite having a high number of debit terminals.  Also noteworthy is that while Japan 
has three times as many debit cards in circulation as residents, the adoption of debit terminals is 
the lowest in our sample.  Thus, both debit terminals and debit cards are required for a high 
number of debit card transactions. 
  To study the evolution of debit card usage within a country, we use a fixed effects 
econometric model with clustered standard errors.  Specifically, our regression is: 
Debit Transactionsit = α + β1 Debit Cardsit + β2 Debit Terminalsit + β3 ATMsit + β4 Checksit  (1) 
+ β5 Bank Branchesit + β6 Share of Self-Employedit + β7 STIRit + εit  
Using the country fixed effects specification means that we are effectively trying to 
explain changes in debit card acceptance in a given country by changes in debit card 
infrastructure and in control variables.  These control variables are intended to capture 
competitive pressures from other payment instruments (cash and checks), as well as the costs of 
facilitating debit card transactions. 
                                                 
16 Van Hove (2004b) reports that merchants in Denmark do not pay any per-transaction fees when accepting debit 
cards. 
17 Canada is an exception, as the number of debit cards there was last reported in 2000.      16
To lessen endogeneity concerns mentioned above, we use measures of the extent of cash 
infrastructure to proxy for cash “competitiveness.”  These measures are the number of ATMs 
and bank branches.  The relationship between debit card usage and ATM is ambiguous because 
greater usage of ATMs may encourage greater comfort with card payments.  On the other hand, a 
greater number of ATMs allows easier access to cash and may lead to greater dependence on 
cash for payments.  Similarly, more bank branches suggest lower acquisition costs of cash, 
thereby encouraging greater reliance on cash.  For alternative paper-based payment 
infrastructure, we include check volumes.  Many U.S. studies have suggested that debit cards 
substitute for checks.  In countries that use checks, we would expect a negative relationship 
between debit card and check transactions. 
The cost of facilitating debit card transactions depends, in part, on merchant size 
distribution.  In particular, smaller merchants would be more reluctant to invest in debit card 
terminals because their transaction volume may not recover the fixed cost.  This is especially the 
case if such merchants still have to accept cash and still incur cash handling costs.  Thus, to 
capture the extent to which merchants can rely on economies of scale in debit card terminal 
acquisition, we look at the country- and time-specific share of small merchants.  One proxy for 
such measure is provided by the ratio of the self-employed to total employment.  In Table 5, we 
report these ratios for 1998.  Note that Italy, Austria, and Japan are near the bottom in debit card 
transactions and are the top three in terms of proportion of self-employed to total employment.  
While fixed effect panel estimation does not allow analysis of the cross-sectional relationships, 
we use this variable to control for consolidation in the retail industry.  A more traditional 
measure of cost of debit card use is their opportunity cost relative to non-interest-bearing 
payment instruments such as cash.  To the extent that demand deposit accounts linked to debit      17
cards generate a positive (albeit low) nominal rate of return, we would expect the number of 
debit card transactions to rise with short-term interest rates.     
All variables in (1) are in logarithms with subscripts i and t indicating, respectively, an 
observation in country i in year t.  The number of debit card transactions, debit cards in 
circulation, ATMs, checks written, and bank branches is expressed in per capita terms, while the 
number of point-of-sale debit card terminals is defined in units per 10,000 residents.
18  The Share 
of Self-Employed is based on the IMF annual employment composition data for each country, 
and STIRit is defined as the short-term interest rate in country i in year t. 
In Table 6, we report our regression results.  Shading indicates coefficient estimates that 
are statistically significant at least at the 5 % level.  In regression (1) (column 1 in Table 6), the 
only variable proxying for debit card infrastructure is the number of debit cards, which is found 
to be a strong indicator of greater debit card use.  In this specification, the number of ATMs also 
has a significant positive effect on debit card transactions, while checks detract from debit card 
usage.  The sign on self-employed is opposite from what we expected, as is that on the short-
term interest rate.   
However, these results are sensitive to a specific measure of debit card infrastructure.  In 
regression (2) that uses the number of debit card terminals, none of the control variables (with 
the exception of the short-term interest rate) retains statistical significance.  This result persists 
when both debit card terminals and cards are used in the regressions (column 3 in Table 6).  
Moreover, in that specification only the number of debit card terminals remains a strong 
predictor of debit card usage.  Taken together, these results suggest that merchant adoption is 
driving debit card usage, and that the number of debit card terminals is indeed a strong 
instrument for transactional demand for debit cards. 
                                                 
18 Check data prior to 2001 does not exist for the United States.      18
V.  Debit Cards and Cash Substitution 
In this section, we study the impact on the cash/GDP ratio resulting from changes in 
payment infrastructure, merchant size distribution and the opportunity cost of holding cash.  We 
assume that central banks provide an elastic supply of currency.  Therefore, supply of cash 
equals demand for cash.  All countries in our sample had their own currencies until 2002 when 
the Euro was introduced.  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands are part of the euro area and have not issued their own currencies since 2002.  
Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States maintained 
their own national currencies throughout the sample period.  Initially, we consider the total stock 
of cash outstanding for each country, but later we segment cash into large, medium and small 
denomination classes to isolate cash’s payment function. 
We plot a time series of currency to GDP ratios in figure 2.  The ratio was decreasing for 
most countries throughout the 1970’s and much of the 1980’s, but flattened out for most 
countries since then reflecting, in part, successful stabilization of inflation.  A number of 
geopolitical shocks that occurred since 1988 had a measurable effect on demand of certain 
currencies.  In particular, the unification of Germany and disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted in 
increased demand for Deutsche marks, while the collapse of the Soviet Union greatly increased 
the demand for U.S. dollars (Fisher, Kohler, and Seitz, 2004; U.S. Department of Treasury, 
2003).  The increased demand for Japanese yen is partly attributable to an extremely low or 
negative inflation environment over the past 15 years. 
We will econometrically test a money demand equation where the demand for money is a 
function of alternate payment infrastructure, cash infrastructure, proportion of small merchants, 
and the opportunity cost of money.  We use the following econometric specification: 
      19
(Currency/GDP)it = α + β1 Debit Card Terminalsit + β2 ATMsit + β3 Bank Branchesit (2) 
+ β4 Share of Self-Employedit + β5 STIRit + εit  
The currency-to-GDP ratio is a convenient metric of money demand.  First, it has a 
simple theoretical interpretation as the inverse of money velocity.  Second, normalization by 
GDP allows us to analyze developments in multiple countries without worrying about exchange 
rate movements.  The ratio is also likely to be stationary, although the short time dimension of 
our data does not allow us to take advantage of this time series property.  Our definition of 
currency includes the outstanding stock of notes and coins.  For euro countries, we only consider 
the period from 1988 to 1999, which eliminates the last two pre-Euro years in which currency 
stocks (particularly those of large-denomination notes) started to decline in anticipation of the 
regime switch.  For the other countries, the sample period is from 1988 to 2003.
19 
The vector of explanatory variables is fairly parsimonious, necessitated by a relatively 
small dataset and the econometric design that relies on fixed effects estimation.  The standard 
money demand variables that capture shoe-leather and opportunity costs of cash are 
complemented with a measure of competing payment instruments.  
As argued in the previous section, the number of debit card terminals at the point of sale 
is a strong instrument for the demand for debit card transactions that likely substitute for some 
cash transactions.
20  In Figure 3, we provide a cross-country snapshot in 1998 of the relationship 
between currency/GDP ratio and the number of debit terminals.  In general, countries with a high 
number of debit card terminals tend to have lower currency/GDP ratios suggesting broadly that 
debit cards may be substituting for cash transactions. 
                                                 
19 As a consequence, we have an unbalanced panel in which non-euro countries are over-represented. 
20 Debit cards could substitute for other non-cash transactions as well.  If debit cards substituted for only non-cash 
transactions, the demand for cash would not be affected by debit card transactions.             20
For cash infrastructure (or shoe-leather cost factors), we use the number of ATMs and the 
number of bank branches per capita.  ATMs are a predominant source of cash in all the countries 
that we study, but the relationship between cash usage and ATMs is ambiguous.  On the one 
hand, greater number of ATMs potentially increase the velocity of cash as consumers can access 
cash more easily.  Hence, more ATMs would imply lower currency stocks.   
However, the relationship between ATMs and cash may be changing over time 
depending on debit card usage at the point of sale.  Initially, the introduction of ATMs increases 
the demand of cash of which a part is in response to filling ATMs with cash by ATM operators.  
In other words, a decrease in demand for cash by individuals is offset by increased demand to fill 
ATMs which may require idle cash especially if they are not serviced daily.  The demand by 
ATM operators for cash may be greater than the reduction of cash holdings by consumers 
especially when the number of ATMs and transactions are increasing.
21  Once the number of 
ATMs has stabilized and/or the amount of withdrawals per machine decreases resulting from 
greater usage of debit cards, the demand for cash by ATM operators would fall.
22 
We use the number of branches of financial institutions as a measure for cash access 
especially for non-ATM dispensed notes and coin.  While payers may not mind withdrawing 
notes of only certain denominations, receivers of cash need to have different denominations on 
hand to make change.  As a result, branches of financial institutions play a key role in disbursing 
currency of varying denominations to consumers and especially merchants.  As in the case of the 
ATMs, a more extensive branching network may either lower day-to-day cash holdings by 
                                                 
21 ATM owners may overstock their machines since they face reputational harm if their machines do not have cash 
when customers arrive.  Furthermore, in some countries, ATM fees compensate ATM who have excess cash in their 
machines. 
22 Snellman and Viren (2006) argue that ATMs can be used as a strategic tool to entice consumers to use non-cash 
electronic payment instruments especially when there is market power in the banking sector.        21
merchants (i.e. increase velocity) or increase overall cash holdings through filling more bank 
vaults or by lowering the costs of, say, converting paychecks to cash.
23   
The share of self-employed in total employment is a proxy for the proportion of small 
merchants in an economy.  We expect a positive relationship between cash and the self-
employed.  Smaller merchants are generally slower in adopting newer payment technologies 
because it takes longer to recover fixed costs and may face higher per-transaction costs.  Having 
a more atomistic employment structure may also be associated with lower levels of tax 
compliance, which would also involve greater use of cash.  The second column of Table 5 lists 
the size of shadow economies for the countries in our sample, as estimated in Schneider (2006).  
A simple comparison of the two columns in Table 5 suggests a positive association between the 
self-employed share and shadow economy size (ρ=0.5).  Finally, the opportunity cost of holding 
cash is measured by the short-term interest rate.  As before, all variables are in logarithms, with 
debit card terminals, ATMs, and bank branches normalized by population.    
All Currency  
  In Table 7, we report results for a number of different econometric specifications.  In 
addition to the variables described above, we add a Y2K dummy to capture any increase in 
currency stock resulting from the Y2K concerns in 1999.  As before, statistical significance at 
the 5% level or better is indicated by shading.   
In the first column, we report our results using a pooled OLS regression, which treats 
cross- and within-country effects as interchangeable.  We find that a 10 percent increase in the 
number of debit card terminals per capita (which is a much lower rate of growth than that 
realized, on average, in our sample countries) results in a 1.2 percent decrease in the 
currency/GDP ratio.  We also find that the number of bank branches positively affects the 
                                                 
23 However, we would expect the demand for cash by merchants would make the relationship between cash and 
bank branches lean in one direction.       22
demand for currency, as does the share of self-employed.  As expected, the short-term interest 
rate is negatively related to cash holdings. 
Pooled OLS regressions applied to country panel can be problematic for two reasons.  
First, they do not differentiate between changes within and between countries.  Second, they fail 
to take into account substantial serial correlation within individual countries.  Thus, OLS 
standard errors may be severely biased, leading to incorrect statistical interpretation of the results 
(Petersen, 2006).  Given large differences across countries exemplified, for instance, in Tables 1-
3, we use a country fixed effects (FE) specification.  As a consequence, we focus on whether 
within-country changes in the explanatory variables affect country-specific changes in currency 
demand.     
While our coefficient estimates are significantly lower when employing a fixed effect 
econometric specification, the coefficients on debit terminals, bank branches, and short-term 
interest rates remain statistically significant.  The coefficient on the self-employed share falls 
from .15 to .02 and is no longer significant.  However, in the FE specification, the number of 
ATMs is negatively correlated with currency stock, with a 10 percent increase in ATMs resulting 
in a 0.4 percent decrease in the currency to GDP ratio.    
The fixed effects approach addresses the second econometric problem – within-country 
serial correlation – only if country-specific effects are constant over time.  A simple analysis of 
residuals from the FE regression suggests that this is not the case.  Consequently, we consider 
two alternative methods of correcting our estimates.  First, we assume that error terms εit are 
first-order autocorrelated.  Second, we compute clustered standard errors (Rogers, 1993), which 
allow an arbitrary temporal dependency pattern within each country (Petersen, 2006).  We 
employ clustered standard errors both with the FE estimator and the random-effects (RE)      23
estimator.  The latter augments FE estimates with information on mean differences across 
countries. 
The results of these three models, shown in columns (3)-(5) of Table 7, highlight both the 
importance of accounting for within-country serial correlation and the sensitivity of results to a 
specific choice of how to do this.  In particular, while the effect of debit card terminals on 
currency demand is negative in all three specifications, it loses statistical significance in a simple 
FE model with cluster-adjusted standard errors (column 3).
24  Making correlation adjustments 
also eliminates any identifiable effect of ATM infrastructure as well as that of the self-employed 
share.  Only the short-term interest rates—the cornerstone of money demand models—retains 
statistical significance in every specification. 
In sum, the results of fixed effects estimation differ substantially from those of pooled 
OLS regressions, particularly if necessary serial correlation adjustments are made.  Again, this 
gives rise to two possibilities—measurement error and model misspecification. 
We entertain the first possibility by restricting the sample to countries that do not have 
substantial foreign demand for their currency.  Although we try to account for the foreign 
component of demand for the U.S. dollars and the Deutsche marks (see section III), these 
adjustments may be rather imperfect.  And since all of the explanatory variables are domestic, 
the foreign demand component still left in the dependent variable would obscure the relationship. 
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results for the sample of 10 OECD countries that exclude 
Germany, Switzerland, and the United States.  Pooled OLS estimates from the truncated sample 
are quite similar to those from the full sample.  Interestingly, there is now much more persistence 
in statistical significance of the estimates across specifications.  We estimate a consistently 
negative effect of debit card terminals on currency demand (although it is still weaker than that 
                                                 
24 Note that, by construction, making the clustering adjustment by itself leaves FE point estimates unchanged.      24
estimated with pooled OLS).  The share of self-employed is estimated to have a positive effect 
on currency demand in 3 out of 4 specifications that include country fixed effects (columns 2-4). 
 Denomination-specific regressions 
  By aggregating all currency denominations along with coins, the different roles of money 
may not be distinguishable.  Consequently, in this subsection we categorize currency into three 
groups—large, medium, and small.  Unlike DGK (2002), the goal of our categorization is to 
isolate transactional and store of value roles of currency.  Our priors are that large denominations 
are primarily used for store of value and affected by short-term interest rates while small 
denominations and coins are used for transactional purposes and affected by the usage of other 
payment instruments such as debit cards. 
  Using ATM-distributed denominations as the “medium-threshold,” we define large and 
small denomination categories as described in section III.  While the ATM-dispensed banknotes 
form the bulk of transactional currency demand by volume, they represent a potentially noisy 
data source for identifying links between the growth of alternative payment instruments and cash 
demand.  We expect smaller denomination notes and coins to be a good gauge of the changing 
needs of merchants and other receivers of cash to make change for purchases.  Since change is 
given only in the case of cash transactions, changes in the stock of small notes and coins likely 
provide the most accurate reflection of fluctuations in transactional demand for currency.
25 
  There are several additional benefits from partitioning the currency by denomination.  
Since the bulk of foreign currency demand is limited to large denominations, we expect the 
small- and medium-notes demand estimates to be more stable across samples (e.g. panels A and 
                                                 
25 In the United States, some merchants, such as grocery stores, are willing to give cash back to their debit card 
customers.  This service is analogous to cash back received for checks, a common means to acquire cash in the 
1980s.  Some analysts have suggested that these merchants provide cash back services to reduce their cash handling 
costs.  However, this practice is not widespread for the countries in our sample.      25
B in Table 7).  Moreover, by isolating ATM-distributed currencies we attempt to provide a more 
precise estimate on what we term the ATM demand factor.  As argued above, the effect of ATM 
on currency demand is ambiguous and existing empirical studies produce conflicting results.  
Finally, if the share of self-employed affects currency demand by facilitating black market 
activity, we would expect to identify a relationship for the large denomination category.
26  If, on 
the contrary, the self-employed stay away from electronic payments for cost reasons, we would 
expect to find an effect on demand for small denominations. 
  The following table summarizes our null hypotheses for denomination-specific models: 





Debit card terminals  <0  ?  ~0 
ATM access  ~0  ?  ~0 
Bank access  ?  ~0  ? 
Self-employed 
>0 if fixed costs 
~0 if tax evasion 
?  ~0 if fixed costs 
>0 if tax evasion 
  The “~0” notation indicates the null of no identifiable effect.  A confirmation of this 
hypothesis for ATM and bank access variables would serve as additional evidence of the 
appropriateness of our currency categorization.  That is, ATM density should affect only ATM-
distributed categories, and bank density should have an effect only on bank-distributed 
categories. 
  Table 8 shows the results of fitting a country fixed effects model with cluster-adjusted 
standard errors to each denomination category.  We chose FE-clustered specification since its 
non-parametric formulation gives us a chance to get standard errors right without making strong 
assumptions.  It is also the only model in which debit terminals had no statistically identifiable 
                                                 
26 Arguably, even the lemonade stand operator wishing to avoid tax payments would at some point have to convert 
coins and small denomination notes it collects for larger notes suitable for storing wealth or transacting.      26
effect on total currency demand in the full sample (see panel A of Table 7).  Thus, it sets a 
somewhat higher hurdle for the denomination-specific exercise. 
Panel A of Table 8 contains full sample estimates.  As expected, debit card terminals 
have a very strong negative effect on demand for small denominations, but not on that for 
medium or large denominations.  Also, the ATM infrastructure is found to affect only the ATM-
dispensed medium category.  This effect is fairly precisely identified (p-value of 0.04) and is 
negative, indicating that, on net, ATM proliferation lowers the stock of ATM-dispensed notes.  
The bank branch infrastructure has a significant (and positive) effect only on bank-distributed 
denominations – i.e. those that cannot typically be obtained from ATMs.  The ratio of self-
employed is influential only for small denomination demand, consistent with the hypothesis of 
high fixed costs of installing electronic payments terminals for small merchants.   
Interestingly, we fail to find a statistically measurable effect of short-term interest rates 
on disaggregated currency demand.  Even the large denomination notes, which in their role as 
store of value should reflect the opportunity costs of currency holdings, have at best a marginally 
significant effect (p-value of 0.11).  However, to the extent that the full sample does not account 
fully for foreign currency holdings, the estimated response to fluctuations in domestic short-term 
rates may be muted.  Thus, we repeat the exercise on the truncated sample that excludes 
Germany, Switzerland, and the U.S. 
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results for the truncated sample.  This time, there is a very 
strong and precisely identified effect of changes in short-term interest rates on changes in large-
denomination currency holdings.  Importantly, all other results are very similar to those obtained 
for the full sample, corroborating the expectation of more stable coefficient estimates across 
samples.        27
  To check for robustness regarding the dividing lines between the denomination classes, 
we also run our regressions using DGK’s classification.  We use 50 British pounds as the cutoff 
between large and medium.  This results in the large denomination category becoming smaller 
while the medium category becomes larger.  The small denomination category is the same as our 
original one.  To compare with DGK, we also report results for a category that combines the 
medium and small classes.   
  In panel A of Table 9, we report the results of our regressions.  For the large 
denomination category, the coefficient on short-term interest rate is now significant in the full 
sample.  Because the large classification is narrower, it is more likely that these notes are used as 
a store of value instead for a medium of exchange. The effect of ATMs is now being picked up 
in the large, and not the medium denomination category.  Debit terminals are estimated to 
dampen the demand for both small and medium denomination notes, although the effect on 
medium notes is identified much less precisely.  In the category where small and medium 
denominations are combined, only the coefficient on debit terminals is significant (and negative), 
suggesting that the medium notes are masking the impact of branches and the self-employed 
ratio. 
  For completeness, we show the same set of regressions without Germany, Switzerland, 
and the United States in panel B of Table 9.  For the large denomination category, ATMs are no 
longer significant but are now significant for the medium category.  Interestingly, the estimated 
ATM sign on the new “medium” specification is now negative.   The results for the combined 
medium and small category in the truncated sample are still negatively related to the number of 
debit card terminals.  
      28
VI. Conclusion 
In the 1990s, the usage of debit cards increased rapidly in all of the countries in our 
sample with the exception of Japan.  Our empirical results suggest that the adoption of POS debit 
terminals by merchants was the key factor in the explosive growth in debit card usage.  This 
suggests that both consumers and merchants generally prefer debit cards to other payment 
alternatives for certain types of transactions.   
Despite the strong growth in the adoption of electronic payment instruments particularly 
debit cards, cash usage remains significant in most OECD countries suggesting that electronic 
alternatives have not succeeded in mimicking all the benefits of cash.  For example, the 
anonymity feature of cash is particularly beneficial for tax evasion or illegal transactions and is a 
key factor for the continued demand for large denomination notes.    
As we have noted, the effect of electronic payment instruments on cash usage has been 
studied by several researchers.  However, previous studies have not been able to capture a 
significant effect of debit cards on cash demand using country panel estimation.  A key feature of 
our econometric model is the ability to disentangle cash’s dual roles—store of value and 
payment media.  We are able to isolate the transactional role of cash by focusing on the small 
denomination class which we define as currency and coin that is lower in value than that 
dispensed by ATMs.  The demand for these notes and coins is driven by purchases requiring 
merchants to make change.  In contrast, electronic substitutes are able to reduce the demand for 
small denomination notes and coins because no change is required for these transactions.  Our 
regression results suggest that the adoption of debit card terminals has reduced the demand for 
cash in small denomination notes and coin.   
Our empirical results suggest that electronic alternatives to cash will indeed reduce the 
demand for cash of certain denominations.  However, the general demand for cash will continue      29
to be strong in the future because of cash’s anonymity and store of value features.  In addition, 
greater usage of OECD currencies in many emerging economies will result in a shift from 
domestic money demand in the country of currency issuance to money demand by residents in 
other countries.  However, only certain OECD currencies are likely to play this role, e.g. U.S. 
dollar and the euro.  The foreign demand for these currencies may decrease as the adoption of 
electronic instruments proliferates globally.      30
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Austria 1 21 109 75 206 213
Belgium 2 64 76 20 162 151
Canada 43 143 25 19 230 220
Finland 0 112 110 16 238 221
France 66 75 42 41 224 219
Germany 1 27 75 73 177 163
Italy 8 19 18 8 53 50
Japan 1 24 10 NAV 36 31
Netherlands 0 80 78 65 222 214
Sweden 0 109 51 16 177 146
Switzerland 0 49 79 7 135 130
United Kingdom 35 94 44 43 216 203
United States 119 132 17 20 288 275
Source: BIS CPSS Red Books and ECB Blue Books various years.
Table 1: 2004 Per Capita Payments by Type of Instrument
34Table 2: Cash Holdings (USD) per Capita and Currency/GDP in 1998 
Country Currency/Capita Currency/GDP
Finland 613 0.024












Source: BIS CPSS Red Books and ECB Blue Books various years.
35October 19, 2000
National Currency NCU US $ NCU US $
Exchange rate 
(NCU/$)
Austria Schillings 5,000           $305 100 - 1,000 $6 - $61 16.40
Belgium Francs 10,000         $208 1000 $21 48.08
Canada Dollars 1,000           $658 20 $13 1.52
Finland Markkaa 1,000           $141 100 $14 7.09
France Francs 500              $64 100 $13 7.82
Germany Deutsche Marks 1,000           $429 10 - 100 $4 - $43 2.33
Italy Lire 500,000       $217 10K - 50K $4 - $22 2307.65
Japan Yen 10,000         $93 10000 $93 107.73
Netherlands Guilders 1,000           $381 100 $38 2.63
Sweden Kronor 1,000           $99 100 - 500 $10 - $49 10.12
Switzerland Francs 1,000           $559 20 - 200 $11 - $112 1.79
United Kingdom Pounds 50                $72 10 - 20 $14 - $29 0.69
United States Dollars 100              $100 20 $20 1.00
Source: CPSS Red and ECB Blue Books and correspondence with central banks
Highest Denomination Most common ATM note
Table 3: Highest Denomination and ATM notes in 13 OECD countries
36Table 4: Debit Terminals/10,000 Residents and Debit Cards per Capita in 2003*








United States 13.23 0.89
Canada 14.24 1.17




*For Canada, 2000 figures are taken because more recent figures are not available




Shadow Economy as % of official GDP 
(1999)
France 7.70 15.2












Source: IMF and shadow economy estimates are from Schneider (2006)
Table 5: Self-employed to Total Employment Ratio
38Dependent variable: log(debit card volume/pop) 1 2 3
log(Debit Card Number/pop) 0.67 0.12
4.81 -0.53
log(Debit Card Terminals/pop) 0.99 0.91
7.25 5.13
log(ATM/pop) 1.32 0.25 0.25
3.19 1.67 1.33
log(Checkvol/pop) -0.51 0 -0.03
(-3.72) 0.02 (-0.23)
log(Bank branches/pop) 1.78 0.17 0.25
1.64 (0..29) 0.45
log(Ratio of self-employed) 38.58 9.56 14.27
2.25 -1.03 1.29
log(Short-term interest rate) -13.9 -4.78 -4.97
(-2.81) (-2.04) (-1.88)
constant -12.51 -5.94 -7.06
N 182 187 182
Goodness-of-fit measure 0.94 0.97 0.97
Table 6: Debit Card Adoption
39Panel A: 13 OECD countries, pre-Euro if applicable
Corrections for country-level serial correlation
Dependent variable: log 









log(Debit terminals/pop) -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
(-10.3) (-2.19) (-1.43) (-3.47) (-2.32)
log(ATMs/pop) -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.01
(-1.3) (-2.13) (-1.34) (1.69) (-0.29)
log(Bank branches/pop) 0.46 0.30 0.30 0.11 0.36
(9.52) (5.78) (4.17) (1.58) (5.68)
log(Ratio of self-employed) 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.14
(3.77) (0.32) (0.15) (1.02) (1.26)
log(Short-term interest rate) -0.30 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09
(-10.5) (-4.27) (-3.18) (-2.09) (-4.05)
Y2K dummy 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.04
(0.19) (1.3) (1.8) (7.23) (1.86)
constant 2.04 1.82 1.82 1.46 1.61







Goodness-of-fit measure 0.67 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.57
Panel B: 10 OECD countries, pre-Euro if applicable; exclude Germany, Switzerland,
and US as countries with a large share of currency abroad or out of circulation.
Corrections for country-level serial correlation
Dependent variable: log 









log(Debit terminals/pop) -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04
(-8.45) (-2.68) (-2.04) (-4.12) (-2.79)
log(ATMs/pop) -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.01
(-3.07) (-1.78) (-1.09) (1.11) (-0.24)
log(Bank branches/pop) 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.35
(3.56) (7.4) (4.51) (2.63) (4.42)
log(Ratio of self-employed) 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.33
(4.89) (2.13) (1.00) (2.08) (2.31)
log(Short-term interest rate) -0.31 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.12
(-9.67) (-4.89) (-4.36) (-2.05) (-4.64)
Y2K dummy 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03
(-0.02) (1.2) (1.71) (5.47) (1.63)
constant 1.61 1.33 1.33 1.01 1.11







Goodness-of-fit measure 0.71 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.52
Table 7: Various Econometric Models of Simple Currency Demand
40Large: greater than ATM-dispensed
Original classification Medium: ATM-dispensed notes
Low: less than ATM-dispensed notes+coin
Panel A: 13 OECD countries, pre-Euro if applicable note: same as alt.
Dependent variable: Large/GDP Medium/GDP Small/GDP
log(Debit terminals/pop) 0.00 0.03 -0.04
(-0.16) (0.88) (-3.69)
log(ATMs/pop) -0.03 -0.24 0.00
(-0.29) (-2.25) (0)
log(Bank branches/pop) 0.42 0.21 0.27
(2.53) (1.04) (2.91)
log(Ratio of self-employed) -0.34 0.29 0.32
(-1.12) (1.3) (3.16)
log(Short-term interest rate) -0.06 -0.04 -0.02
(-1.65) (-1.57) (-1.46)
Y2K dummy 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.34) (0.73) (-0.12)
constant -2.57 -4.95 -5.81





Goodness-of-fit measure 0.07 0.21 0.66
Panel B: 10 OECD countries, pre-Euro if applicable; exclude Germany, Switzerland,
and US as countries with a large share of currency abroad or out of circulation.
Dependent variable: Large/GDP Medium/GDP Small/GDP
log(Debit terminals/pop) -0.03 0.03 -0.04
(-1.13) (1.15) (-3.21)
log(ATMs/pop) 0.05 -0.27 0.00
(0.78) (-2.75) (0.09)
log(Bank branches/pop) 0.47 0.26 0.30
(2.56) (1.29) (2.97)
log(Ratio of self-employed) 0.22 0.24 0.40
(0.88) (0.54) (2.69)
log(Short-term interest rate) -0.13 -0.03 -0.03
(-5.24) (-0.76) (-1.59)
Y2K dummy 0.05 0.00 -0.01
(1.63) (-0.01) (-0.48)
constant -3.81 -5.00 -6.07





Goodness-of-fit measure 0.26 0.46 0.64
logarithm of
logarithm of
Table 8: Denomination-specific currency demand: FE model with cluster-adjusted SEs
41Large: greater than 50 GBP
Alternative classification Medium: ATM-dispensed notes if less than 50GBP
Low: less than ATM-dispensed notes+coin
Panel A: 13 OECD countries, pre-Euro if applicable
Dependent variable: Large/GDP Medium/GDP Small/GDP (Medium+Small)/GDP
log(Debit terminals/pop) 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06
(1.44) (-2.01) (-3.69) (-2.3)
log(ATMs/pop) -0.26 0.12 0.00 0.09
(-1.99) (1.4) (0) (1.34)
log(Bank branches/pop) 0.56 -0.18 0.27 -0.10
(2.31) (-0.95) (2.91) (-0.64)
log(Ratio of self-employed) -0.19 -0.04 0.32 0.04
(-0.53) (-0.19) (3.16) (0.21)
log(Short-term interest rate) -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.02
(-2.2) (0.62) (-1.46) (0.77)
Y2K dummy 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03
(0.65) (1.73) (-0.12) (1.62)
constant -3.42 -3.78 -5.81 -3.66






Goodness-of-fit measure 0.11 0.21 0.66 0.26
Panel B: 10 OECD countries, pre-Euro if applicable; exclude Germany, Switzerland,
and US as countries with a large share of currency abroad or out of circulation.
Dependent variable: Large/GDP Medium/GDP Small/GDP (Medium+Small)/GDP
log(Debit terminals/pop) 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06
(0.93) (-2.58) (-3.21) (-2.89)
log(ATMs/pop) -0.22 0.15 0.00 0.12
(-1.86) (2.18) (0.09) (2.05)
log(Bank branches/pop) 0.60 -0.17 0.30 -0.10
(2.27) (-0.91) (2.97) (-0.59)
log(Ratio of self-employed) 0.26 0.36 0.40 0.38
(0.71) (1.58) (2.69) (2.07)
log(Short-term interest rate) -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(-4.05) (-1.13) (-1.59) (-0.97)
Y2K dummy 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.00
(1.62) (0.3) (-0.48) (0.24)
constant -4.53 -4.82 -6.07 -4.53






Goodness-of-fit measure 0.27 0.26 0.64 0.28
logarithm of
logarithm of


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series 
 
A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal 
Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics. 
 
Standing Facilities and Interbank Borrowing: Evidence from the Federal Reserve’s   WP-04-01 
New Discount Window  
Craig Furfine 
 
Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications   WP-04-02 
William J. Bergman, Robert R. Bliss, Christian A. Johnson and George G. Kaufman 
 
Real Effects of Bank Competition   WP-04-03 
Nicola Cetorelli 
 
Finance as a Barrier To Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in   WP-04-04 
Local U.S. Markets? 
Nicola Cetorelli and Philip E. Strahan 
 
The Dynamics of Work and Debt   WP-04-05 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11   WP-04-06 
Jonas Fisher and Martin Eichenbaum 
 
Merger Momentum and Investor Sentiment: The Stock Market Reaction 
To Merger Announcements   WP-04-07 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle   WP-04-08 
Gadi Barlevy and Daniel Tsiddon 
 
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets:  The Case of Payment Networks  WP-04-09 
Sujit Chakravorti and Roberto Roson 
 
Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy   WP-04-10 
Javier Díaz-Giménez, Giorgia Giovannetti, Ramon Marimon, and Pedro Teles 
 
On the Timing of Innovation in Stochastic Schumpeterian Growth Models   WP-04-11 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
Policy Externalities: How US Antidumping Affects Japanese Exports to the EU WP-04-12 
Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Sibling Similarities, Differences and Economic Inequality WP-04-13 
Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Determinants of Business Cycle Comovement: A Robust Analysis WP-04-14 
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas 
 
The Occupational Assimilation of Hispanics in the U.S.: Evidence from Panel Data WP-04-15 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau  
 2 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Reading, Writing, and Raisinets
1: Are School Finances Contributing to Children’s Obesity? WP-04-16 
Patricia M. Anderson and Kristin F. Butcher  
 
Learning by Observing: Information Spillovers in the Execution and Valuation WP-04-17 
of Commercial Bank M&As 
Gayle DeLong and Robert DeYoung 
 
Prospects for Immigrant-Native Wealth Assimilation:  WP-04-18 
Evidence from Financial Market Participation 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Individuals and Institutions:  Evidence from International Migrants in the U.S.  WP-04-19 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Are Technology Improvements Contractionary?  WP-04-20 
Susanto Basu, John Fernald and Miles Kimball 
 
The Minimum Wage, Restaurant Prices and Labor Market Structure  WP-04-21 
Daniel Aaronson, Eric French and James MacDonald 
 
Betcha can’t acquire just one: merger programs and compensation  WP-04-22 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Not Working: Demographic Changes, Policy Changes,  WP-04-23 
and the Distribution of Weeks (Not) Worked 
Lisa Barrow and Kristin F. Butcher 
 
The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in Macroeconomic Stabilization  WP-04-24 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Advertising and Pricing at Multiple-Output Firms: Evidence from U.S. Thrift Institutions  WP-04-25 
Robert DeYoung and Evren Örs 
 
Monetary Policy with State Contingent Interest Rates  WP-04-26 
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles 
 
Comparing location decisions of domestic and foreign auto supplier plants  WP-04-27 
Thomas Klier, Paul Ma and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
China’s export growth and US trade policy  WP-04-28 
Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Where do manufacturing firms locate their Headquarters?  WP-04-29 
J. Vernon Henderson and Yukako Ono 
 
Monetary Policy with Single Instrument Feedback Rules  WP-04-30 
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles 3 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Firm-Specific Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle  WP-05-01 
David Altig, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Jesper Linde 
 
Do Returns to Schooling Differ by Race and Ethnicity?  WP-05-02 
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 
Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout  WP-05-03 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions  WP-05-04 
Robert DeYoung, Anne Gron and Andrew Winton 
 
Characterizations in a random record model with a non-identically distributed initial record  WP-05-05 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Price discovery in a market under stress: the U.S. Treasury market in fall 1998  WP-05-06 
Craig H. Furfine and Eli M. Remolona 
 
Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets  WP-05-07 
Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent 
 
Rigid Prices: Evidence from U.S. Scanner Data  WP-05-08 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Benjamin Eden 
 
Entrepreneurship, Frictions, and Wealth  WP-05-09 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Wealth inequality: data and models  WP-05-10 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
What Determines Bilateral Trade Flows?  WP-05-11 
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas 
 
Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the U.S., 1940 to 2000  WP-05-12 
Daniel Aaronson and Bhashkar Mazumder  
 
Differential Mortality, Uncertain Medical Expenses, and the Saving of Elderly Singles  WP-05-13 
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones 
 
Fixed Term Employment Contracts in an Equilibrium Search Model  WP-05-14 
Fernando Alvarez and Marcelo Veracierto 
 
Causality, Causality, Causality: The View of Education Inputs and Outputs from Economics  WP-05-15 
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 
 4 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Competition in Large Markets  WP-05-16 
Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Why Do Firms Go Public?  Evidence from the Banking Industry  WP-05-17 
Richard J. Rosen, Scott B. Smart and Chad J. Zutter 
 
Clustering of Auto Supplier Plants in the U.S.: GMM Spatial Logit for Large Samples  WP-05-18 
Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
Why are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? 
Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation  WP-05-19 
Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
 
Constructing the Chicago Fed Income Based Economic Index – Consumer Price Index:  
Inflation Experiences by Demographic Group: 1983-2005  WP-05-20 
Leslie McGranahan and Anna Paulson 
 
Universal Access, Cost Recovery, and Payment Services  WP-05-21 
Sujit Chakravorti, Jeffery W. Gunther, and Robert R. Moore 
 
Supplier Switching and Outsourcing  WP-05-22 
Yukako Ono and Victor Stango 
 
Do Enclaves Matter in Immigrants’ Self-Employment Decision?  WP-05-23 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau 
 
The Changing Pattern of Wage Growth for Low Skilled Workers  WP-05-24 
Eric French, Bhashkar Mazumder and Christopher Taber 
 
U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation  WP-06-01 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter  WP-06-02 
Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib 
 
Identification of Search Models with Initial Condition Problems  WP-06-03 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Tax Riots  WP-06-04 
Marco Bassetto and Christopher Phelan 
 
The Tradeoff between Mortgage Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings  WP-06-05 
Gene Amromin, Jennifer Huang,and Clemens Sialm 
 
Why are safeguards needed in a trade agreement?  WP-06-06 
Meredith A. Crowley 5 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth  WP-06-07 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
A New Social Compact: How University Engagement Can Fuel Innovation  WP-06-08 
Laura Melle, Larry Isaak, and Richard Mattoon  
 
Mergers and Risk  WP-06-09 
Craig H. Furfine and Richard J. Rosen 
 
Two Flaws in Business Cycle Accounting  WP-06-10 
Lawrence J. Christiano and Joshua M. Davis 
 
Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?  WP-06-11 
Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles 
 
Chronicles of a Deflation Unforetold  WP-06-12 
François R. Velde 
 
Female Offenders Use of Social Welfare Programs Before and After Jail and Prison: 
Does Prison Cause Welfare Dependency?  WP-06-13 
Kristin F. Butcher and Robert J. LaLonde 
 
Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size  WP-06-14 
Gary Gorton, Matthias Kahl, and Richard Rosen 
 
Do Bonds Span Volatility Risk in the U.S. Treasury Market? 
A Specification Test for Affine Term Structure Models  WP-06-15 
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni 
 
Transforming Payment Choices by Doubling Fees on the Illinois Tollway  WP-06-16 
Gene Amromin, Carrie Jankowski, and Richard D. Porter 
 
How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?  WP-06-17 
Gene Amromin, Paul Harrison, and Steven Sharpe 
 
Will Writing and Bequest Motives: Early 20th Century Irish Evidence  WP-06-18 
Leslie McGranahan 
 
How Professional Forecasters View Shocks to GDP  WP-06-19 
Spencer D. Krane 
 
Evolving Agglomeration in the U.S. auto supplier industry  WP-06-20 
Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
Mortality, Mass-Layoffs, and Career Outcomes: An Analysis using Administrative Data  WP-06-21 
Daniel Sullivan and Till von Wachter 
 6 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:  
Tying One’s Hand through the WTO.  WP-06-22 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
How Did Schooling Laws Improve Long-Term Health and Lower Mortality?  WP-06-23 
Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Manufacturing Plants’ Use of Temporary Workers: An Analysis Using Census Micro Data  WP-06-24 
Yukako Ono and Daniel Sullivan 
 
What Can We Learn about Financial Access from U.S. Immigrants?  WP-06-25 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Bank Imputed Interest Rates: Unbiased Estimates of Offered Rates?  WP-06-26 
Evren Ors and Tara Rice 
 
Welfare Implications of the Transition to High Household Debt  WP-06-27 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics  WP-06-28 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Oligopoly Dynamics with Barriers to Entry  WP-06-29 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Risk Taking and the Quality of Informal Insurance: Gambling and Remittances in Thailand  WP-07-01 
Douglas L. Miller and Anna L. Paulson 
 
Fast Micro and Slow Macro: Can Aggregation Explain the Persistence of Inflation?  WP-07-02 
Filippo Altissimo, Benoît Mojon, and Paolo Zaffaroni 
 
Assessing a Decade of Interstate Bank Branching  WP-07-03 
Christian Johnson and Tara Rice 
 
Debit Card and Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Analysis  WP-07-04 
Gene Amromin and Sujit Chakravorti 